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SIMON MARTIN
Football, Fascism and Fandom in Modern Italy
This paper will examine the relationship between Fascism and football in Italy from the 
regime’s origins in the mid -1920s through to the present day and will seek to explain 
the far right’s continued presence in the game. Contextualising Italian football’s devel-
opment within the nation’s postwar history, it will argue that while the Fascist regime 
laid the foundations of the contemporary game, its influence was not profound enough 
to explain the far -right’s existence in Italian stadiums since the 1980s. By situating 
the politicisation of Italian football within theories of post -Fascist memory and via the 
examination of specific incidents of pro -regime and anti -Semitic activity within 
the stadiums, this paper will argue that the failure to combat the far -right’s presence 
has been a direct consequence of the weakness/absence of the Italian state.
Keywords: football; Italy; memory; neo -fascism; supporters.
Remember those mobile phone advertisements where they asked people who they 
most would like to have a one -to -one with? Ian Wright picked Dr Martin Luther 
King, my choice would have been Mussolini. 
Di Canio (2001: 310) 
This paper will examine the relationship between Fascism and football (calcio) 
in Italy, from the mid -1920s and the rise of Italy’s Fascist regime up to the 
present day, focusing on how the stadium has become a key venue for both 
reviving the memory of the regime and Mussolini and for expressing and 
propagating extremist ideology. Its objective is to establish how the far right’s 
contemporary association with the game has developed and the extent to which 
it can be traced back to Italian Fascism of the 1930s. The chronology of this 
analysis will establish the fundamentals of Fascism’s takeover of the game before 
contextualising its development in post -Fascist Italian history. Drawing upon 
existing knowledge regarding Fascist memory, it will make an original contri-
bution to the understanding of football and politics in Italy by contextualising 
the game’s enduring connection with the far right within the framework of 
contemporary Italian history. While there has been a growing interest in the 
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politicisation of Italian football and its fan groups, there has been no academic 
consideration of the long -term connection between Italian Fascism and foot-
ball, as if the strong link between the two had been broken by the political 
rupture occurring in 1945.  Following the collapse of Fascism in 1943 and the 
Nazi -Fascist puppet -state the Italian Social Republic1 in 1945, the reconstitu-
tion of the Fascist party was made illegal by the 1947 Italian Constitution, and 
the apology of Fascism banned by the 1952 Scelba Law.2 Extreme right -wing 
ideologies nonetheless persisted in postwar Republican Italy, and football has 
since provided a visible outlet for the expression of their beliefs. Not simply a 
sporting/political issue, however, this is indicative of a number of unresolved 
problems within the postwar state that have permitted the far right to maintain 
its presence and visibility. Through analysis of the secondary literature regarding 
Fascist memory and contemporary news reports that have highlighted the far 
right’s exploitation of stadiums as highly visible political venues, this paper will 
offer an explanation as to why the relationship between football and Fascism 
in Italy has been so enduring. Beginning with the 2017 case of stickers at the 
Stadio Olimpico (Rome) that portrayed Anne Frank wearing an AS Roma 
shirt, the article will establish Fascism’s roots in the game and how its memory 
and continuing popularity have been created and explained. Italy’s failure to 
definitively break with Fascism and even begin to come to terms with its past 
will be seen to have contributed to the extreme politicisation of Italian society 
in the 1970s, which was transferred into the stadiums and their fan groups. 
One of the groups most associated with neo -Fascism is SS Lazio’s ‘Irriducibili’ 
ultraS, who have established a close relationship with former players Paolo Di 
Canio and Sinisha Mihajlovic´. Their political identities will be examined before 
finally addressing the recent establishment of interdependencies between the 
football clubs, television, business interests and politics that have shaped the 
game’s production and consumption and have turned it into a ‘Wild West’ of 
entertainment where almost anything is permitted with little or no sanction, 
including the unfettered propagation of Fascist ideology.
Anne Frank
In October 2017, some SS Lazio fans attended the Serie A match against 
Cagliari from the unfamiliar curva sud of the Stadio Olimpico, the ‘home’ 
1 The Italian Social Republic (Republic of Salò) was the Nazi -Fascist puppet state formed in 
central -northern Italy following the public announcement of the Italian Armistice with the Allies 
on 8 September 1943 until the surrender of German troops in April 1945.
2 See Legge 20 giugno 1952, no. 645, accessed on 04.12.2017, at http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/
serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=1952-06-23&atto.
codiceRedazionale=052U0645&elenco30giorni=false.
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end for their archrivals of AS Roma. The identities of each club and their 
fan groups are distinctive and rooted in their origins, as Francesco Ricatti 
points out in his analysis of Roman football. Roma, which had adopted 
the symbol of the she -wolf and the colours of the city (dark red/yellow) 
developed a strong connection with the urban center and its working class 
whereas Lazio – the team’s name being the same as the province in which 
Rome is located – came to represent the surrounding region. While Roma 
fans took pleasure in derogatively referring to their Lazio rivals as burini, 
those who came in from the countryside to sell butter, Lazio supporters 
equally refer to Roma as a team of butchers and Jews, based upon their 
original core areas of support in Rome, which included the slaughterhouse 
and the ghetto (Ricatti, 2010: 222 -223).
Banned from their own customary end (curva nord) of the Olimpico 
following racist chants the previous week, the Lazio club exploited a 
loophole to allow fans to attend the match by annulling their season tickets 
for one game and buying a ticket for the curva sud, at a token price of €1. 
This sleight of hand deliberately undermined the punishment imposed 
by Italy’s sporting justice system and brought the Irriducibili ultraS into 
the ‘enemy territory’, where they conducted what the football federation 
(FIGC) President Carlo Tavecchio described as an “unspeakable act” 
(Pinci, 2017b: 51). A man not known for using politically correct speech,3 
in 2014 when discussing the issue of foreign players in Serie A, Tavecchio 
referred to “‘Opti Poba’ who used to eat bananas before coming here and 
now he plays for Lazio”.4
Roma’s apparent Jewish links, combined with the ticketing scam, explains 
how and why some members of the Irriducibili (Immovables) ultraS chose 
to leave stickers in the curva sud stating ‘romanista ebreo’ (the Roma fan is 
a Jew) plus another with the image of Anne Frank, one of the most well-
-known victims of the Holocaust, wearing a Roma shirt (Pinci, 2017a). 
The ‘logic’ – it is offensive to be called a Jew – is not exclusive to Lazio fans 
either; Roma supporters have also painted ‘Anne Frank supports Lazio’ on 
walls in the city (Pinci, 2017b; Merlo, 2017). As one Jewish woman stated: 
“Roma and Lazio ultras who are usually divided by the stupidity of football 
are, however, united in their use of blind anti -Semitism” (Merlo, 2017).
3 Associated Press, “Italian FA’s Carlo Tavecchio criticised over discriminatory remarks”, The 
Guardian, 1st of November 2015. Last accessed on 06.01.2018, at https://www.theguardian.com/
football/2015/nov/01/italian-football-association-carlo-tavecchio.
4 “Figc, scivolone razzista di Tavecchio: ‘Mangiava banane ora gioca nella Lazio’”, il Fatto 
Quotidiano, 26 July 2014. Last accessed on 04.12.2017, at https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.
it/2014/07/26/figc-scivolone-razzista-di-tavecchio-mangiava-banane-ora-gioca-nella-lazio/290374/.
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SS Lazio President Claudio Lotito made an apparently penitent visit to 
the Rome Synagogue to lay a wreath in Lazio colours, for which he was 
criticised by Rome’s Rabbi Riccardo Di Segni. His statement that “the 
Jewish community is not a washing machine” (Bisbiglia, 2017) appeared 
to be a direct reference to how Italy’s far right sought to cleanse itself of 
its extremist and anti -Semitic past via openly apologetic gestures, a topic 
which this paper will return to. Lotito’s visit had little effect. As passages 
from Anne Frank’s diary were read aloud in Serie A stadiums prior to the 
next round of Serie A matches and players wore T -shirts opposing anti-
-Semitism, a small minority of Lazio fans sang the Fascist hymn ‘Me ne 
frego’ (Marrese, 2017). 
Calcio’s contemporary relationship with neo -Fascism was evidenced again 
within weeks, with Eugenio Maria Lupi’s post -goal celebratory gesture for 
his Seconda Categoria5 team, Futa 65. Taking off his team jersey to reveal 
a T -shirt bearing the flag of the Italian Social Republic, the player also gave a 
straight -armed Roman salute. Officially part of the Fascist regime since 1925, 
this salute was adopted as a substitute for what was considered the bourgeois 
handshake in 1932. According to Simonetta Falasca -Zamponi, it became 
“the sine qua non of the real Fascist, the element without which one could 
not be considered a Fascist” (Falasca -Zamponi, 2000: 113). Controversial 
enough as it stands, Lupi’s gesture was even more scandalous given the team’s 
opponents, Marzabotto. In 1944, the area surrounding this village south of 
Bologna, was witness to a mass murder of at least 770 citizens carried out by 
Nazi Waffen SS forces. The “reasons for the massacre have never been fully 
explained” but historians “now agree that the massacre was not a ‘reprisal, 
but an act of preventative terrorism aimed at the civilian population’” (Foot, 
2009: 133). Although this match took place at a relatively low level of Italian 
football, attention was drawn to the incident by the President of the Regional 
Committee for the Honour of the Fallen at Marzabotto, Valter Cardi, who 
protested at the area being “forced to accept the umpteenth unacceptable 
insult during a football match” (Camilletti, 2017). In an attempt to distance 
itself from the incident, the club and its players, without Lupi, visited the 
Marzabotto Memorial chapel one week after the event.6
There is much in these episodes to explain how and why Italy has had 
such difficulty in separating football from Fascism, including ignorance, a 
5 Seconda Categoria is effectively the seventh level of Italian football: Serie A, Serie B, Serie C, 
Eccellenza, Promozione, Prima Categoria, Seconda Categoria, Terza Categoria. 
6 “Marzabotto, il calciatore fascista non andrà al Sacrario con la squadra”, la Repubblica.it, 17 
November 2017. Last accessed on 04.12.2017, at http://bologna.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/11/17/
news/marzabotto_il_calciatore_fascista_non_andra_al_sacrario_con_la_squadra-181339282/.
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fundamental disrespect for authority, the ineffectual nature of Italian justice, 
a lack of leadership, and the important relationship between football clubs 
and ultrà groups of supporters. Before turning to these, however, the origins 
of the relationship should be established.
Football and Fascism
Football and Fascism have been linked since Mussolini’s regime restruc-
tured the game in 1926 with the Carta di Viareggio. Fascism took interest 
when calcio quickly became arguably the most significant mass popular 
cultural practice in Italy. In response to the game’s rapid expansion 
across the country and its consequent disorderliness, Fascism set about 
restructuring the sport and moulding it to respond to the regime’s needs 
as a tool of propaganda and national identity. Principally done via the 
imposition of a new Fascist hierarchy of officers, a new constitution 
that imposed disciplinary measures and rules regarding foreign players, 
and the creation of Italy’s first national competition, this stimulated the 
formation of new clubs such as AS Roma and AC Fiorentina. Although 
there was no single overriding motive for the intervention, seizing control 
of an increasingly chaotic game was crucial for a regime that had forced 
its way into power while promising to restore order to Italian society. 
At the same time, the Carta di Viareggio was underpinned by the concept 
of nation: Serie A would offer a national competition with which all Italians 
could identify, while improving standards and thereby the competitiveness 
of the national team in the international arena.7 Fascism’s intervention 
changed football in Italy forever and stamped an enduring mark upon 
the game via its organisation, stadiums and successes. Italy hosted and 
won the 1934 World Cup, holding on to the trophy in France in 1938; in 
the interim a team of Italian university students won the 1936 Olympic 
football tournament. Thus, Fascism’s intervention and investment certainly 
reinforced the game’s pre -existing solid foundations for the game while 
Italy’s mythical heroes, matches, and victories were filtered to the general 
public via a highly censored mass media and later retold, thus developing 
an inevitably long -standing association with the regime. However, “the 
clear identification between aspects of the regime and footballing success 
also led to an embarrassed silence on behalf of many about those victories 
[…] Italy’s relationship with the football of the 1930s, as in so many areas, 
was a difficult one” (Foot, 2006: 442 -443). 
7 On the restructuring of calcio see Martin (2004: 51 -66).
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Fascist Memory
The fall of Fascism on 25 July 1943 began the de -Fascistisation of Italian 
sport, as the Italian Olympic Committee (Comitato Olimpico Nazionale 
Italiano – CONI) was divided in two parts between liberated Italy and 
the Republic of Salò. The former international tennis player, ice skater, 
journalist and sports administrator Count Alberto Bonacossa was made 
head of CONI. A strong monarchist, he was the perfect candidate to briefly 
head CONI during the challenging period between the fall of Fascism on 
25 July 1943 and the Armistice declaration on 8 September of the same year. 
He also represented much about change, or the lack of it, in post -regime 
Italy. While he had never held a position of responsibility under Fascism, 
he was most likely sympathetic to its rule, and his appointment by Marshall 
Badoglio’s government indicated how ‘post -Fascist’ Italy would be one of 
continuity and discontinuity rather than a country that had definitively 
broken from its past.8 Rather than substantially altering the old order and 
posing difficult questions as to ordinary Italians’ responsibility for what had 
happened under Fascism, the focus for change was one that sought to sweep 
away the trappings of the old regime and those considered responsible for 
leading it. Although Bonacossa abandoned his position after little more 
than a month, he was reconfirmed as an International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) Executive Committee member in 1946. Conducting much of Italy’s 
immediate postwar sporting diplomacy, he protected its IOC membership 
and avoided its exclusion from international competition, unlike what had 
occurred with Germany and Japan (Forcellese, 2013: 169 -172).
First appointed as CONI regent on 28 June 1944, and then Extraordinary 
Commissioner in October 1944, Giulio Onesti re -launched Italian sport. 
Criticised for appointing individuals tainted by their relationship with 
Fascism, he was accused of making CONI more oligarchic than it had been 
under the regime.9 The issue reflected the broader problem of what to do with 
former regime activists who remained within the government administration 
and state apparatus. In a state where Fascist Party membership had been 
mandatory, the complete eradication of those who had been employed in 
the civil service under the regime was impractical. The ‘cleansing’ that did 
take place, however, was that of partisans or anti -Fascists that entered the 
public administration immediately after the liberation.10  This situation was 
exacerbated by the lack of any formal justice proceedings for prominent 
8 On the continuity -discontinuity of CONI in the immediate post -Fascist period, see Bonini 
(2006: 123 -130).
9 For Onesti’s account of the measures taken, see Onesti (1986: 72 -75).
10 For more details see Ginsborg (1990: 92 -93); Lepre (2004: 29 -30).
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members of the political, military, judicial and economic leadership of 
Fascist Italy who had planned or carried out war crimes, unlike that for 
Nazi leaders at the Nuremburg trials.11 
This continuity was also the responsibility of the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI). By the mid -1930s leading PCI figures Palmiro Togliatti and Antonio 
Gramsci had already begun to theorise Fascist rule by acknowledging its 
popularity among the Italian middle class. Advocating the construction of 
long -term alliances with the middle classes rather than a direct attack upon 
the state, ‘the Italian road to socialism’ was intended to avoid revolution 
and the possibility of Italian communism once again contributing to the 
conditions for the collapse of democracy (Foot, 2014: 203). Committed 
to cooperating with its political rivals, the PCI’s deal with other anti-
-Fascist parties was confirmed by party leader Togliatti’s ‘about turn’ at 
Salerno (svolta di Salerno) in March 1944, in which the theoretically still 
revolutionary PCI accepted the immediate leadership of the king and 
the prospect of shared government with the Catholics and monarchists. 
Furthermore, as Minister of Justice in the post -liberation anti -Fascist 
coalition, Togliatti pushed through an amnesty that enabled many Fascists 
to escape punishment. As there was no wholesale reform of the 1930 Rocco 
penal code, many judges who were either Fascists or who worked within 
its system remained in post after 1945, and despite widespread support for 
their abolition, the Prefects12 survived although many of them had supported 
Fascism during its rise and time in power. 
Sport further reflected this, with considerable continuity between officers 
of the regime and the Republic. A notable case was that of the Florentine 
noble, the Marquis Luigi Ridolfi, who joined the Fascist movement in the 
spring of 1921. He participated “actively in the activities of the Fascist 
squads and was vice -commander of the II Florentine legion during the 
March on Rome”, in 1922, which forced Mussolini into power (Lungonelli, 
2016). Secretary of the Provincial Fascist Party, from 1926 -1929, Ridolfi was 
made a Parliamentary Deputy in 1934 and reconfirmed in 1939 and 1943.13 
He was also the founder (1926) and first president of AC Fiorentina and 
the driving force behind the construction of the club’s avant -garde stadium, 
the former ‘Giovanni Berta’ now Artemio Franchi.14 Unlike national -team 
11 See Focardi (2014); Focardi and Klinkhammer (2004). 
12 The Italian state’s key representative at the local level since 1865, Prefects were appointed to each 
city, with responsibility for controlling public order, overseeing elections, and the administration 
and execution of laws. 
13 On Ridolfi, see Cantagalli (1972); Galluzzo (1999); Palla (1978); Martin (2004).
14 See Galluzzo (2000).
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manager Vittorio Pozzo whose “supposed links to the regime […] led to 
his isolation in the 1950s and 1960s and to the new stadium in Turin not 
being named after him in 1990” (Foot, 2006: 442), Ridolfi continued to hold 
important positions within Italian sport post -Fascism. In 1951 he became 
head of the FIGC’s Centro tecnico (coaching centre) and relaunched the 
idea of a football ‘university’ for players and coaches that had been mooted 
in the interwar years. Inaugurated a few months after his death in 1958, the 
centre at Coverciano, in the periphery of Florence, was dedicated to him. 
President of the Italian Athletics Federation (FIDAL) from 1930 -1942, 
Ridolfi was unanimously elected in 1957, holding the post until his death. 
From 1954, he was also a member of CONI’s board that exerted significant 
international influence via three Italian members of the IOC Executive 
Committee – ex -international tennis player Giorgio De Stefani, former Turin 
Podestà (Fascist Mayor), Prefect and Minister of Finance, Paolo Thaon di 
Revel, and Alberto Bonacossa.15 Aristocratic and self -financed, they were 
kindred spirits amongst the IOC’s oligarchic elite and key to Italy’s successful 
bid to host the 1960 Olympic Games16 that came “above all, thanks to the 
choice of a sporting politics of continuity by CONI” (Forcellese, 2013: 167).
The presence of former Fascists and sympathisers at all levels of 
government, public service and state administration contributed to the 
creation of a broad idea of Italians as intrinsically good people – brava 
gente – who were victims rather than accomplices or supporters of Fascism. 
Pushing the blame for the post -1938 excesses of the Fascist regime 
principally onto the influence of Nazi Germany thus creates a ‘bad German/ 
/good Italian’ discourse that shifts or eliminates any sense of guilt for what 
happened, thereby creating the image of a benign regime and leader. This is, 
of course, contingent upon whether Fascist Italy’s brutal colonial campaign 
in Eastern and Northern Africa, racial legislation, and concentration camps, 
for example, are even recognised let alone critically analysed. The long -term 
result of this has been 
a rehabilitation of Fascism and Mussolini, as if nothing happened in Italian history. 
While Fascism has not exactly become ‘good’, it is no longer made to appear as 
something completely ‘bad’. This neutral profile legitimizes many of the values, ideals 
and references that have been, and often still are, used by some right wing parties. 
(Mammone, 2006: 213)
15 On Thaon di Revel, CONI, IOC and previous connections with the Fascist regime, see Forcellese 
(2013: 175 -176).
16 See Martin (2017).
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The postwar Republic’s failure to effectively deal with the legacy of 
the regime was evident in its acceptance of “the creation in 1946 by the 
defeated Fascists of a political party, which, if not calling itself Fascist, 
clearly indicated itself as the successor to the RSI by calling itself the 
Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano – MSI)” (Dunnage, 
2002: 133). Thus, the repression and distortion of memory was critical to 
the existence and development of postwar neo -Fascism and the MSI. The 
party’s unrepentant links to the regime lasted until its 1995 party congress at 
Fiuggi where, in an attempt to create a legitimate political force capable of 
governing, the MSI was dissolved and replaced by the post -Fascist Alleanza 
Nazionale (AN). Driven by Gianfranco Fini, he rejected the MSI’s previous 
references to Fascism, condemned anti -Semitism and the 1938 Racial 
Laws, visited the Fosse Ardeatine monument in Rome17 to pay homage the 
Partisans and Italians soldiers executed there, before going to Auschwitz 
in an act of recognition of those murdered at the concentration camp in 
addition to the Italians soldiers killed at or deported from the Russian 
front.18 Improving the party’s electoral and government prospects, it was 
hugely controversial among its base of support, and a faction of the old MSI 
remained loyal to its ideals. Refusing to join the Alleanza Nazionale, they 
formed the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (MSFT). As Testa and 
Armstrong note, this “Movimentist brand of fascism is present today in the 
majority of the Italian neo -fascist youth groups and is certainly recognizable 
amid the UltraS” (2010: 91).
Ultras
At this point some consideration of the semantic debate regarding the dif-
ference between ultrà and ultraS is required. The first point to underscore is 
that these committed groups of fans are not necessarily, by nature, violent. 
In differentiating between the two terms, Ricatti has argued that while 
ultrà is sometimes substituted with ultras, both “are usually synonymous, 
although they are sometimes used with different meanings by supporters 
of Roma, who indicate with the first the traditional Italian soccer barrak-
ers, and, with the latter, groups closer to the English model of hooligans” 
(2010: 221). Testa and Armstrong also dispute the frequently presumed 
assumption that earlier established ultrà and the more recent ultraS are 
synonymous with the English term ‘hooligan’: “In the Italian context, the 
17 In 1944, 335 Italians were executed at the Ardeatine Caves in reprisal for a Partisan attack that 
killed 33 Nazi troops in Rome. 
18 “Fini: ‘Nessuna graduatoria tra Shoa, foibe e gulag’”, la Repubblica.it, 18 February 1999. Last 
accessed on 06.01.2018, at http://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/fini/fini/fini.html.
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UltraS are perhaps hooligans, but of a very different ilk, because they are 
now inextricably linked with late 20th -century Italian neo -fascism” (Testa 
and Armstrong, 2010: 3).
A further bridge connecting Fascist football of the 1930s to the neo-
-Fascism of the stadiums today was the period of intense and extreme political 
violence in Italy from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Both a playing -out 
of the unresolved civil war19 from 1943 -1945 and the dominant postwar 
Christian Democratic Party’s failure to introduce reforms in response to the 
dramatic modernisation of Italian society during the ‘economic miracle’, 
the polarisation of Italian politics, the politicisation of the piazzas and the 
accompanying violence was transferred into football stadiums. 
The protest movement that began in the universities in 1968 and moved 
into the factories the following year radicalised large sectors of society and 
left a tradition of small and highly politicised groups of young Italians from 
which the ultrà emerged. Strongly identifying with their stadium, club and 
locality, they took the conflict felt in Italian public life into the stadiums, 
gave calcio a political context and significance, and offered supporters a 
political identity. Divided by their support for communism or neo -Fascism, 
they united around an objection and resistance to all forms of organisation 
and control (Triani, 1990: 133 -134). Mimicking the style, structures and 
countercultural features of political groups (Podaliri and Balestri, 1999: 
91), the creation of ultrà collectives at both ends of the political spectrum 
was reflected in their names, such as Milan’s leftist ‘Fossa dei Leoni’ (Lion’s 
Den), arguably the first modern ultrà group formed in 1968, and the ‘Brigate 
Rossonere’ (Red and Black Brigades), and their right -wing city rivals of the 
Inter Boys SAN (Armed Black -and -Blue Squad) “formed by members of 
the Fronte della Gioventù – the youth movement of the Italian neo -fascist 
party MSI” (Testa and Armstrong, 2010: 71).
The impact of Italy’s post -1968 radicalisation was reflected in the SS Lazio 
team that won its first league title in 1974 with a group of eccentric players 
renowned for their passion for firearms, militarism, parachuting and some 
who supported the MSI.20 The club’s title success attracted new supporters 
and recruits to the curva nord where groups such as the Folgore, who were 
named after an elite parachute regiment of the Italian military that was 
much admired by neo -fascist youths, began to appear. Some of these groups 
combined to form the Eagles Supporters in 1976, who organised spectacular 
matchday displays. Dedicated but relatively pacifist and unpoliticised, 
19 See Pavone (1991); Foot (2009).
20 On SS Lazio and its players in this period, see Chiappaventi (2004).
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they contrasted and occasionally clashed with the more extreme Vikings who 
dominated the curva until 1987 and the emergence of the Irriducibili, who 
have gone on to become its main force (Testa and Armstrong, 2010: 55 -56).
The power struggles within the curva nord were indicative of how, during 
the 1970s and 1980s, many older leaders lost control as groups began to 
fragment into smaller factions. While some became politically neutral or 
apolitical, others developed local and national political agendas. Cities 
with two clubs often had distinctive political identities, as in AC Milan 
being the traditional team of the railway workers/working class and their 
rivals Internazionale representing the more conservative bourgeoisie. 
Club identities also reflected regions with distinctive political allegiances, 
most notably those in the Northern League (Lega Nord) strongholds of 
Lombardy and Veneto that frequently demonstrated strong anti -southern 
and racist rhetoric. As local and provincial identities became intensified 
by the impact of globalisation upon albeit misguided ideas of Italian 
homogeneity, many fan groups shifted towards the extreme right of politics. 
With cities increasingly interpreted as piccole patrie (small countries/ 
/motherlands), there was a corresponding increase in xenophobia and racism. 
Such ideas and behaviours became increasingly evident among AS Roma’s 
Boys, who rose to ascendancy in the late 1980s as the old guard of the curva 
sud began to dissipate. Taking the double -bladed axe as their symbol, the 
pillars of their ideology are equally predictable and populist: the glorification 
of Mussolini as the greatest man in Italian history and the honouring of 
ancient Rome and the Fascist era, bound together by cultural memory that 
reinterprets and reinvents the past. In 2005 at Livorno, a hated adversary 
due to both the city’s and team’s strong Communist history, they unveiled 
flags displaying swastikas and Celtic crosses (the symbol of neo -Fascism) and 
sang choruses of ‘Duce, Duce’ in reference to Mussolini.21 The events were 
repeated at the Stadio Olimpico the following January when Roma hosted 
Livorno and included a black and white banner stating: “Lazio -Livorno: 
stessa iniziale, stesso forno” [Lazio -Livorno: same beginnings, same oven].22 
Once again seeking to offend via the connection with Jewishness, the 
banner worked linguistically in Italian due to the rhyme between the words 
‘Livorno’ and ‘forno’. Evidencing how club leaders were careful not offend 
extreme supporters, AS Roma president Franco Sensi asked simply “that politics 
21 “Svastiche nella curva romanista”, La RepubblicaSport.it, 18 September 2005. Last accessed on 
07.01.2018, at http://www.repubblica.it/2005/i/sezioni/sport/calcio/svas/svas/svas.html.
22 “Olimpico, svastiche in curva sud. ‘Lazio -Livorno: stesso forno’, La RepubblicaSport.it, 29 June 
2006. Last accessed on 07.01.2018, at http://www.repubblica.it/2006/a/sezioni/sport/calcio/
serie_a/svastiche/svastiche/svastiche.html.
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stay out of the stadium”. Taking a similar line regarding sport and politics, 
Rome Mayor Walter Veltroni nonetheless connected the incident with the 
city’s past: “politics must stay out of the stadium […] but even more so 
the apology for the Nazi regime that brought so much horror and death to the 
world […] Rome is the city of the deportation of the Jews, Rome is the city of 
the Fosse Ardeatine. Behaviour like this cannot be tolerated”.23 Spokesperson 
for Rome’s Jewish community Riccardo Pacifici demanded a response from 
the Interior Minister Beppe Pisanu and Head of Police Marcello Fulvi, 
as to why the 1993 Mancino Law24 that condemns the diffusion of racially -, 
ethnically - or nationally -based hatred had not been applied after numerous 
Jewish and non -Jewish fans in attendance at the stadium protested directly to 
the police (Caccia, 2006). By no means the first such incident, a similar banner 
appeared during the 1998 Rome derby: “Auschwitz is your homeland, the 
ovens your homes” (Caccia, 1998).25 It was unfurled by Lazio’s Irriducibili, 
one of the ultrà groups most associated with neo -Fascism. 
Taking the eagle as their symbol, which is shared with that of the 
club albeit stylistically different, the Irriducibili motto – ‘Dare, Believe, 
Be Reckless’ – requires little imagination when associating it with the 
Fascist regime’s mantra for Italian youth – ‘Believe, Obey, Fight’. Admiring 
ancient Rome, the imperial past and glorifying Mussolini, they share these 
sympathies with their neo -Fascist Roma rivals. Such ideas are central to 
the ultraS’ highly traditional and symbolic view of the world, and within 
this context, the importance of Mussolini goes beyond simply the flags 
in the stadiums. Viewed as the great man of Italian history, an individual 
who represented and enacted the will of the people, this revision of history 
is offered outside of the context of the regime’s inherent violence and 
involvement in atrocities. It is also often presented as a purer, more honest 
period and thus contrasted with the corruption of contemporary politics.
Coming soon after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe, the ‘Tangentopoli’ corruption scandal in the early 1990s brought 
an end to the postwar First Republic and prompted some historians to 
reconsider the events of 1943 -1945 and Italy’s liberation. Rather than a 
moment of collective identification, the re -assessment of the Resistance 
accused the PCI of “manipulating the historical record for its own base 
23 “Olimpico, svastiche in curva sud. ‘Lazio -Livorno: stesso forno’, La RepubblicaSport.it, 29 June 
2006. Last accessed on 07.01.2018, at http://www.repubblica.it/2006/a/sezioni/sport/calcio/
serie_a/svastiche/svastiche/svastiche.html.
24 Decreto Legge 26 aprile 1993, no. 122. Accessed on 07.01.2018, at http://presidenza.governo.
it/USRI/confessioni/norme/dl_122_1993.pdf.
25 On the development and politics of Roman UltraS groups, see Testa and Armstrong (2010: 43 -49). 
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political motives” (Carter, 2010: 168) and reduced the role of Communist 
partisans in the birth of the democratic republic. At the same time, it also 
extended to a rehabilitation of the regime and Mussolini. 
A clear example of this was Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s insistence, 
in 2003, that “Mussolini never killed anyone. Mussolini used to send people 
on vacation in internal exile”.26 Dangerously misleading and completely 
disingenuous, it is fake history. Presenting an apparently legitimate reading of 
the past, the distortion creates more respectability/acceptability for what was 
previously considered morally repugnant, which was important for Berlusconi’s 
government coalition that included the right -wing Alleanza Nazionale. 
Paolo Di Canio
Revising Fascism naturally eases any difficulty that might exist for fans 
who extol a romanticised version of Italy’s Fascist past. Viewing the pre-
sent through the past also appealed to Mussolini, who assumed the title of 
Il Duce. The Latin for DUX (leader), former Irriducibili member and 
ex -Lazio player Paolo Di Canio has this tattooed on his bicep along with 
a Roman eagle and helmeted head of Mussolini on his back. An open 
supporter of Fascism and its leader, in January 2005 he gave a Roman 
salute to the Irriducibili after Lazio’s victory in the Rome derby, an act that 
was appreciated by Alessandra Mussolini, Il Duce’s granddaughter and a 
parliamentary deputy at the time: “What a lovely Roman salute, I liked it 
a lot. It moved me and I’ll send him a thank you card”.27 While Di Canio 
sought to distance himself from her comments, he repeated the gesture 
against Siena, Livorno and Juventus on 17 November. Receiving a match 
ban and a fine of €10,000, Lazio successfully overturned the suspension. 
Demanding “recognition of the legitimacy and complete absence of ille-
gality in the Roman salute”, the appeal revealed the grey area that covers 
the apology of Fascism in Italy. As Di Canio’s defense argued, while the 
Constitution explicitly forbids the reformation of the dissolved Fascist party, 
it also clearly guarantees the freedom of expression of thought. Thus, the 
crime of Fascist apology can only exist when there is the aim of re -forming 
the Fascist party. The Roman salute alone thus would not be a crime.28 
26 “New storm over Berlusconi ‘remarks’”, BBC News, 11 September 2011. Last accessed on 
09.12.2017, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3101198.stm.
27 “Saluto romano, bufera su Di Canio. La Figc attiva l’ufficio indagini”, la Repubblica.it, 7 January 
2005. Last accessed 07.01.2018, at http://www.repubblica.it/2005/a/sezioni/sport/calcio/serie_a/
salutocanio/salutocanio/salutocanio.html?refresh_ce.
28 “‘Sono fascista ma non un razzista’. Di Canio si difende dalle accuse”, la Repubblica.it, 23 
December 2005. Last accessed 23.12.2017, at http://www.repubblica.it/2005/l/sezioni/sport/
calcio/dicaniosalut/noraz/noraz.html.
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With no definitive clarification ever reached regarding its illegality or oth-
erwise, it became indicative of Italy’s national problem.
Di Canio also explained what the gesture meant to him: “I make the 
Roman salute as a greeting to comrades, it is dedicated to my people. With 
that straight arm I don’t want to incite violence, nor racial hatred […] My 
salute […] is not political but exclusively sporting”.29 Defining himself as a 
Fascist but not a racist, he has used this defense on two high -profile occasions. 
In March 2013, a polemic erupted in the United Kingdom (UK) following 
his appointment as manager of Sunderland AFC, which drew the immediate 
resignation of former UK Foreign Minister David Milliband from his position 
as the club’s Vice -Chairman (Quinn, 2013). In September 2016, he was 
removed as a presenter of Italian Sky Sport’s English football program the 
Di Canio Premier Show, after appearing on air in a polo shirt that revealed 
his DUX tattoo (Vendemiale, 2016). More surprising for the fact that Sky had 
employed him in the first place, given his tattoos and opinions were hardly a 
well -kept secret, it once again revealed Italian football’s turning a blind -eye 
to Fascism, unless there are economic implications. 
Di Canio’s comment declaring himself a Fascist but not a racist could 
apply to some of Fascism’s early idealists: Mussolini initially opposed ideas 
of Nordic racism until his scientists finally discovered that Italians were, 
in fact, Aryan.30 All the same, it is a complex case to argue and requires the 
type of selective reading of the past that is evident in his autobiography. 
Claiming that Mussolini was “a deeply misunderstood individual”, Di Canio 
presents him as a man of principle punished for speaking his mind. Free 
to express his opinion, as he says, it is nonetheless not a historical fact that 
“Mussolini managed to rally an entire country around him”. Consensus 
for the regime is, in fact, one of the great historical debates about Italian 
Fascism. Most alarmingly he states: 
While I admire the way he built his power, I am fascinated by the way he wielded it 
and consolidated it. Mussolini was convinced that he had to save the country from 
others. To him, the stakes were immense, there was a higher end which justified his 
means […]
He deceived people, his actions were often vile or calculated. But all this was 
motivated by a higher purpose. At stake was the fate of the nation. He sacrificed 
individuals for what he thought was the greater good. And he did do a lot of good, 
29 “‘Sono fascista ma non un razzista’. Di Canio si difende dalle accuse”, la Repubblica.it, 23 
December 2005. Last accessed 23.12.2017, at http://www.repubblica.it/2005/l/sezioni/sport/
calcio/dicaniosalut/noraz/noraz.html.
30 On Fascist racial policy, see Gillette (2003), Ipsen (1996), Sarfatti (2006) and Livingston (2014). 
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from introducing national pensions, from modernizing the railways to restoring pride 
to an entire people. (Di Canio, 2001: 311)
It is an interesting defence of Mussolini that justifies the means, such 
as the murder of the Socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti and the total 
abrogation of democracy and civil rights, for the ends, the apparent rescuing 
of the country. It is pure populism at best, fake history at worst, albeit one 
that has growing support in Italy where expressing esteem for Fascism and 
its deeds is no longer unusual. 
Sini a Mihajlovic´
Christian Bromberger has suggested that “If the general style and make-
-up of a team allows the expression of a collective identity, the individual 
player wins the favour of different sectors of the public according to the 
qualities that he demonstrates” (Bromberger, 1999: 114). Clearly relevant 
to Di Canio, it is also interesting when applied to former Lazio player 
Siniša Mihajlovic´who, in 2000, called Arsenal’s Patrick Vieira “a fucking 
black monkey” during a Champions League match in which Lazio fans also 
“taunted Arsenal’s black players and hurled objects at the team” (Brodkin, 
2000). Commenting on the incident, Di Canio did not condone Mihajlovic´ 
but also questioned what had provoked him. His criticism was strongest 
however for Vieira: “By going public with it, one of the basic rules of football 
was broken: the idea that what happens on the pitch stays on the pitch” 
(Di Canio, 2001: 303). It is indicative of how there is still a sense in Italy 
that the football stadium operates in a separate sphere, detached from the 
norms and laws that govern everyday life. The result is a type of ‘free zone’ 
where anything goes. The Anne Frank stickers are the most recent example 
of this, but a comparable incident almost twenty years earlier reveals a fur-
ther reason for the existence and growth of extremism in Italian football: 
the inability or lack of desire by the authorities to tackle the problem. 
In January 2000, days after the assassination of the Serbian paramilitary 
leader Željko Ražnatovic´, more commonly known as Arkan, the Irriducibili 
unveiled a banner declaring ‘Honour to the Tiger, Arkan’. The former 
leader of the Red Star Belgrade ultras who commanded the paramilitary 
‘Serbian Volunteer Guard’ – known as ‘ARKAN’s Tigers’ – during the 
Yugoslav Wars, he was indicted for crimes against humanity, grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws or customs of war 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 
1997). According to Irriducibili spokesmen, their gesture had nothing to 
do with politics but because “Arkan was a great Red Star ultrà and friend 
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of [Siniša] Mihajlovic´ who is our friend and in the past has recognised our 
losses by placing flowers beneath the curva” (Caccia, 2000). Mihajlovic´ 
himself contributed to the problem by describing Arkan as a “hero for the 
Serb people” in an obituary he wrote.31 While supported by Alessandra 
Mussolini,32 the banner was almost unanimously condemned. This included 
Lazio’s Croatian striker Alen Bokšic´, who claimed he would have left the 
field had he been playing.33 
The Arkan banner finally forced the authorities into action,34 but while 
neo -Fascist flags and banners have almost disappeared from Italian stadiums 
due to careful surveillance of fans entering and fines imposed upon the 
respective clubs, the Anne Frank stickers prove that such attitudes and 
the capacity to act have not been eliminated. This raises an obvious question 
and introduces a final important point when examining the clear presence 
of neo -Fascism within Italian stadiums: How is it that fans are able to carry 
out such activities with impunity, with no intervention from the authorities? 
The answer connects contemporary football with that of the Fascist regime, 
via the municipal authorities who have built and still own the stadiums. 
Neo -Patrimonial Football
In his 2014 text entitled Governing the Italians, Sabino Cassese, an Emeritus 
Judge in the Constitutional Court, argued that the weaknesses of the Italian 
state have resulted in a separation between legal Italy and real Italy – the Italy 
that exists in the statute books as opposed to that of everyday life – and that 
these shortcomings have overseen the development of a public administra-
tion that is weak when dealing with the strong and strong when dealing with 
the weak. The relationship of disloyalty and mistrust between the people 
and the state has created a malaise which manifests itself in low electoral 
turnout, worrying levels of tax evasion and avoidance, corruption, and the 
predominance of organised crime. Incapable of carrying out its functions, 
31 “Mihajlovi su Arkan e la guerra in Jugoslavia”, il Post, 1 April 2006. Last accessed 07.01.2018, 
at http://www.ilpost.it/2016/04/01/mihajlovic-condo-sky/.
32 “Striscioni dell’Olimpico. Un’altra bufera sul calico”, la Repubblica.it, 31 January 2000. Last 
accessed 07.01.2018, at http://www.repubblica.it/online/sport/anticipo/polemiche/polemiche.html.
33 “Boksic e lo striscione -Arkan. ‘Io avrei smesso di giocare’”, la Repubblica.it, 31 January 2000. 
Last accessed on 07.01.2018, at http://www.repubblica.it/online/sport/anticipo/arkan/arkan.html.
34 One of the plans to deal with offensive banners was to suspend the match and allow time for their 
removal. Increasingly tough legislation has been introduced, often by decree law, which by -passes 
parliamentary debate to impose emergency legislation, e.g., the Pisanu Law following the death 
of policeman Fillipo Raciti in 2007. With little positive effect, such laws have made it increasingly 
difficult for non -ultrà fans to attend matches. Alongside the expansion of DASPO (Diffida ad 
Assistere alle manifestazione sportive) football banning orders, these have reinforced the ultras’ 
sense of persecution and legitimacy as the true voice of football fans. 
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the inefficient state turns to external resources and parallel organisations to 
strengthen it. Frequently unaccountable, inefficient and corrupt, they only 
weaken it further. Cassese did not discuss Italian sport, but his argument is 
easily applicable and evident in how calcio has been developing.
As the authority and power of the state has been challenged, changed and 
increasingly diminished over the last two decades, so then have influential 
actors across politics and business stepped in to fill the void and accumulate 
resources to the detriment of others. For calcio, this has created a number of 
interdependencies between clubs, television, business and politics that have 
shaped the game’s production and consumption. Many of these changes 
derive from the arch neo -liberalist Silvio Berlusconi who used AC Milan 
to promote his business brand and extend political connections, thereby 
encouraging other industrial families to do the same.35 The new relationship 
between politics and football was consecrated when Berlusconi became Prime 
Minister. His government’s salva -calcio law enabled clubs to delay repaying 
tax debts and would also have allowed them to offset the devaluation of 
their players against tax, that is, had European Union’s anti -trust regulations 
not blocked it. Having spent heavily to promote his brand through football, 
AC Milan would have been a major beneficiary, along with the likes of Lazio 
and Parma. The extent of the connections between business and football 
and the FIGC’s weak regulatory capacity was evidenced by the collapse 
of the Parmalat and Cirio companies and the direct impact upon Lazio 
and Parma.36
The absence/weakness of the state, as argued by Cassese, can thus be 
seen to have contributed to a crisis of authority in calcio that prohibits the 
creation and implementation of essential reforms, safety regulations, and 
measures to establish and impose acceptable standards upon the game. 
Within the UK, the obligation for safety and the associated economic costs 
reside with the clubs, who use stewards and third -party security firms to 
establish and maintain order. With clubs made accountable for the behavior 
and welfare of their consumers, police activity is restricted to public order 
roles away from stadium. By contrast, various branches of the Italian state 
and military police forces employ traditional patterns and methods of control 
to maintain order within Italian stadiums, which is presuming they are able 
to enter in the first place. Lazio’s curva nord and Roma’s curva sud at the 
Stadio Olimpico were notorious as self -regulating, no -go zones for police.
35 The Tanzi family who owned Parmalat dairy produce company bought Parma; Sergio Cragnotti, 
the owner of the Cirio canned food brand, bought Lazio.
36 On the administration, governance and regulation of recent Italian football, see Hamill et al. 
(2010).  
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Exempting club presidents from de facto responsibility for what goes 
on within their stadiums is intensified by the fact that so few clubs (almost 
none, in fact) actually own their stadiums. The majority belong to the local 
municipal authority, many of which were first constructed under the Fascist 
regime and designed as multi -sport venues for the specific use and benefit 
of the local community rather than uniquely for football clubs. Moreover, 
not only are they old, many are also considered buildings of historical 
value with protection orders that seriously restrict their redevelopment, 
which leaves them unsuited to the modern, corporate, income -generating 
‘game’ which professional football has become. Consequently, as Italy’s 
economic fortunes have worsened over the last twenty years, so too have 
municipal authorities suffered from increasingly smaller budgets to spend 
on maintaining let alone improving sporting facilities. In the UK, in addition 
to the huge amounts of wealth generated by television rights for coverage of 
the Premier League, clubs receive financial support from central government 
initiatives and funded agencies to modernise their stadiums, most notably 
after the 1989 Hillsborough disaster. UK stadiums have thus become part 
of a wider leisure experience that clubs can exploit seven days per week 
whereas in Italy, where various governments have employed little more 
than knee -jerk crisis management, the necessary changes required for true 
modernisation remain blocked by the neo -patrimonial relationship between 
football, politics and business. Thus, the government regulations that have 
been introduced have tended to focus on those who attend matches rather 
than the game and its infrastructure, which has augmented the sense of 
persecution and anger among fans. As Doige has argued:
The communal nature of Italian stadiums is clearly reductive. At the current time, 
no one is considering the experience of fans […] By permitting clubs to own their 
own ground, they will be inclined to consider the experiences of their own fans. 
If the clubs can invest in the facilities then they can begin to capitalize on these 
investments and begin to compete with other leagues. They can also attract a wider 
range of fans, rather than the predominantly masculine fans that frequent the 
stadium nowadays. (2015: 104)
The lack of investment has thus contributed to unsafe stadiums, falling 
attendances, reduced revenues, and a continuing crisis within Italian football 
that has stimulated and permitted a growth in violence and extremism for 
which nobody appears to accept responsibility. In terms of modernising 
calcio, only Juventus has shown any initiative with its construction of the 
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Juventus Stadium37 that opened in 2011, although it must also be noted 
that the club has almost unrivalled access to private capital. Elsewhere, 
stadiums built in the 1920s and 1930s have fallen into disrepair with little 
renovation since the works undertaken for the 1990 World Cup. Thus, 
the modernisation of Italian football is dependent upon both the money 
and will to implement and enforce necessary changes. With both of these 
severely lacking, they can be seen to have contributed to many of the 
extremist incidents discussed, which includes the representation and growth 
of Fascism and racism within Italian stadiums, a phenomenon that continues 
to go unchecked.  
Conclusion
History is rarely linear, and the pathway from Fascist football in 1930s Italy 
to neo -Fascism in the stadiums of today is far from direct. The regime’s 
investment, exploitation, and propagandising of the game was significant 
and left an enduring footprint through its stadiums and the national league, 
Serie A. Fascism was not, however, rooted deeply enough in Italian society 
for its postwar survival and positive memory to be seen as inevitable. The 
ideological and class conflict in the midst of the fight for liberation from 
1943 -1945 created a division in Italy along political lines that has never 
been fully reconciled. The consequence has been a divided memory of the 
past that has been further fuelled by ignorance, periods of extreme political 
violence, and an inefficient state apparatus that rewards connections over 
talent and, in the early postwar years, provided a welcome refuge for those 
with nostalgic memories of the past. 
The neo -Fascist presence has never been strong enough to seriously 
threaten a return, but it did slow processes, change, and reforms that might 
have seen the development of a more efficient country and one in which 
such nostalgia was positively discouraged. Thus, the politicised Italian 
stadiums of today reflect the country’s postwar development and some of the 
fundamental weaknesses that have made it so difficult to govern effectively. 
The absent state has frequently shown itself as both incapable of creating 
law and enforcing what legislation already exists. Evident cases in point, 
the stadiums became vacuums of authority that accommodated the politics 
of the Italian piazzas. Public and more or less de facto autonomous spaces, 
while they were initially exploited by both left - and right -wing extremists, 
they have increasingly become the domain of neo -Fascist groups wishing 
to express what would normally be considered unacceptable speech. Thus, 
37 It was renamed the Allianz Stadium in July 2017.
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while the far right’s contemporary association with football can be traced 
back to Italian Fascism of the 1930s, it is the state’s weaknesses in terms of 
governing and guiding post -Fascist Italian society that has been fundamental 
in enabling a concerted attempt to revise Italy’s past and has allowed this 
situation to develop unchecked in football stadiums. Ranging from the 
production of a more palatable version of history to the direct rehabilitation 
of Fascism, the link from Mussolini to the Anne Frank stickers at the Stadio 
Olimpico is clear.  
Edited by Scott M. Culp
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Futebol, fascismo e adeptos na Itália 
moderna
Este artigo analisa a relação entre o fas-
cismo e o futebol na Itália, desde as origens 
do regime em meados da década de 1920 
até aos nossos dias, e tenta explicar a pre-
sença contínua da extrema -direita no jogo. 
Contextualizando o desenvolvimento do 
futebol italiano na história pós -guerra do 
país, argumenta -se que, embora o regime 
fascista tivesse lançado as bases do jogo 
contemporâneo, a sua influência não foi 
suficientemente profunda para explicar a 
presença da extrema -direita nos estádios 
italianos desde os anos 80. Situando a poli-
tização do futebol italiano nas teorias da 
memória pós -fascista e através da análise 
de incidentes específicos de atividade pró-
-regime e antissemita dentro dos estádios, 
este artigo argumenta que o fracasso em 
combater a presença da extrema -direita é 
consequência direta da fraqueza/ausência 
do Estado italiano.
Palavras -chave: adeptos; futebol; Itália; 
memória; neofascismo.
Football, fascisme et supporters  
dans l’Italie moderne
Cet article se penche sur la relation entre le 
fascisme et le football en Italie, à compter 
des origines du régime, dans les années 
1920, à nos jours et tente d’expliquer la 
présence continue de l’extrême droite dans 
ce sport. En contextualisant le développe-
ment du football italien dans l’histoire de 
l’après -guerre du pays, nous soutenons 
que, bien que le régime fasciste ait lancé les 
bases du jeu contemporain, son influence 
ne fut pas suffisamment profonde pour 
expliquer la présence de l’extrême droite 
dans les stades italiens depuis les années 
80. En situant la politisation du football 
italien dans les théories de la mémoire 
post -fasciste et par le biais de l’analyse 
d’incidents spécifiques de l’activité pro-
-régime et antisémite dans les stades, cet 
article défend que l’échec constaté dans le 
combat à la présence de l’extrême droite 
est une conséquence directe de la faiblesse/ 
/absence de l’État italien.
Mots -clés : football; Italie; mémoire; néo-
fascisme; supporters.

